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1.  INTRODUCTION  
1.1  Background   
 
Nationalisation has emerged as a dominant idea to address and deal with issues of socio-economic 
inequality in South Africa. Nationalisation generally refers to the acquisition of private entities or 
interests and/or corporations by the state with or without compensation. 
To understand the current political debates on nationalisation, the starting point is the Freedom 
Charter which is considered by some to be the unofficial constitution of the country.1  The Freedom 
Charter states that "the mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be 
transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole".2 This has been interpreted by some in the 
political sphere to be a call for nationalisation. 
The position of the governing party (the current government) on nationalisation has never been 
constant. In 1956 a young Nelson Mandela said that "the position of the Freedom Charter is that 
the wealth of the nation must be transferred to the people". In this instance, it can only be assumed 
that the transfer of wealth to the “people” entails transfer to a representative state.3 In 1991 Nelson 
Mandela said that the "ANC is prepared to abandon its policy on nationalisation if the business 
community provides an alternative".4 In 2012 former President Jacob Zuma said that 
"nationalisation is not ANC or government policy… our policy is a mixed economy".5 
Notwithstanding the aforesaid, during the ANC’s 54th national conference which took place in 
December 2017, the ANC resolved that the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) should be wholly 
owned by the state,6 which is a call for nationalisation. Further, the Economic Freedom Fighters, 
 
1Freedom Charter http://www.historicalpapers.wits.ac.za/inventories/inv_pdfo/AD1137/AD1137-Ea6-1-001-
jpeg.pdf  - 05 October 2020. 
2 Freedom Charter (n 1). 
3 http://www.ancyl.org.za/show.php?=5502 – 05 October 2020. 
4 http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/nelson-mandela-announces-intentions-nationalistaion-policy - 05 October 
2020. 
5 http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/mine-nationalisation-not-anc-policy-1232105 - 05 October 2020. 
6http://joeslovo.anc.org.za/sites/default/files/docs/ANC%2054th_National_Conference_Report%20and%20Resoluti





the main proponents of nationalisation in the South African political arena, also introduced a bill 
to legislate the nationalisation of the SARB, which is yet to be passed into law.  
From the onset, I must state that I do not intend to focus on the debate of whether the call to 
nationalise the SARB is legitimate or not. However, it is imperative, for contextual purposes, to 
outline the history of the SARB, its shareholding structure, and the legal implications of 
nationalisation of the SARB. 
There are contrasting views as to whether it would be effective to change the mandate of the SARB 
as contained in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Constitution).7 They are, in the 
first place, whether nationalisation, which would alter the shareholding of the SARB, would be a 
more effective manner to deal with the structural inequality in South Africa, and, secondly, 
whether the intention to nationalise the SARB is purely symbolic and legally ineffective. 
This mini dissertation seeks to evaluate the two contrasting perspectives. The first is that the 
nationalisation of the SARB will compromise its independence and functioning. The second is that 
nationalisation of the SARB will have no legal effect and will not change the mandate of the 
SARB. The evaluation will be conducted by considering court judgments, legal commentary, 
academic writings, and policy documents from foreign jurisdictions. In addition, the mini 
dissertation will briefly consider monetary policies adopted by central banks in other jurisdictions 
and how these may be considered in any potential expansion of the mandate of the SARB.   
 
1.2 Research question 
 
The research is intended to provide a legal analysis of the proposed nationalisation of the SARB. 
In dealing with this question, this research examines the shareholder composition of the SARB, 
shareholder rights, and the legal implications of nationalisation on the mandate of the SARB and 
its shareholding.  








The methodology used is that of a comparative study coupled with a literature review.  The 
literature gathered is contained in case law, economics and law journals, newspaper articles, policy 
documents, and statutes.  In gathering the aforesaid sources, a desk-top approach was followed, 
which entailed an analysis of the effectiveness of the laws and regulations in place in South Africa 
regulating the SARB and nationalisation.  
1.4 Outline of the dissertation 
 
Paragraph one is introductory and provides a historical context of the policy of nationalisation in 
South Africa in the broad sense and, thereafter, is narrowed to the current debate of the 
nationalisation of the SARB. It further provides a summary of the research question and key points 
to be discussed. 
Paragraph two sets the scene by providing historical background on the formation and 
development of the SARB since its inception. More importantly, and central to this research, the 
shareholding structure of the SARB is set out, from the number of issued shares to the limitation 
on shareholding and the power derived from such shareholding. Further, this paragraph deals with 
the mandate and independence of the SARB as contained in the Constitution.  
Paragraph three starts with a critical analysis of the nationalisation both as a concept and a policy 
consideration.  Secondly, this paragraph consists of an analysis of the SARB Amendment Bill, 
which is a private member’s bill introduced by Julius Malema, the leader of the Economic Freedom 
Fighters. The discussion will focus on the purpose of the Bill, its legal implications, and possible 
shortcomings.  Paragraph three also contains a constitutional analysis of the SARB Amendment 
Bill. The question as to what nationalisation of the SARB would entail in the context of section 25 
of the Constitution, is investigated specifically. This is undertaken considering the principles 
enunciated by the Constitutional Court in the cases of First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank 
v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Minister of Finance8 and Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy.9 The 
focus is on the concepts of deprivation and expropriation.  
 
8 2002 4 SA 768 (CC). 





Paragraph four provides a comparative study of some of the central banks elsewhere in the world 
that have maintained private shareholders, namely those of Belgium, Greece, Italy and Japan. In 
addition, I also provide an analysis of the varying mandates of central banks in foreign jurisdictions 
to ascertain whether there are viable ways to expand the mandate of the SARB to deal directly 
with issues faced by South Africa as a developing economy.  
Paragraph five contains the conclusion which also interrogates the questions of whether the 
nationalisation of the SARB may be only symbolic and whether it may impede on the 
independence of the SARB.  
2. THE SARB 
 
2.1 History of the SARB 
 
The earliest calls for the establishment of a central bank in South Africa were made in about 1879 
by the Afrikaner Bond,10 a political party founded in 1880 in the then Cape Colony which was 
based on the ideals of Afrikaner nationalism.11  
Before the establishment of the SARB, the British government through the Bank of England played 
the role of a central bank in South Africa. That was the case even post the establishment of the 
Union of South Africa.12 The implication was, inter alia, that the South African national currency 
at the time was the British gold sovereign, which was coined by the Royal Mint in London and 
functioned as legal tender in South Africa.13 
The remainder of the South African currency consisted of banknotes printed and issued by the 
existing commercial banks.14 The banknotes were fully backed by gold in terms of a gold standard, 
which meant that the notes could be directly exchanged for gold at a fixed exchange rate.15 The 
terms of this arrangement were such that “the domestic currency was pegged to the British 
 
10South African Reserve Bank Commemorative publication 2011- 
https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/4987/SARB%20Commemorative%20
publication.pdf  - 03 September 2020.  
11 https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/afrikaner-bond  - 15 December 2020.  
12 Stephen Gelb “The origins of the South African Reserve Bank” African Seminar Studies Seminar Paper (1984) 3. 
13 Gelb (n 12). 
14 South African Reserve Bank Commemorative publication (n 10) 3. 





currency (pound sterling) which, in turn, was pegged to the US dollar and, therefore, the gold 
price”.16  
In November 1914, as a wartime measure, the South African government placed an embargo on 
the export of gold from South Africa to preserve specie supply. In response, the banks resorted to 
issuing more banknotes and did not increase the amount of gold specie held.  
The pegging of the pound sterling to the dollar ended in March 1919, when the British government 
abandoned it. As a consequence, the value of the pound sterling depreciated against the US dollar 
which resulted in a gold premium being produced.17 The result was that gold obtained in South 
Africa through the conversion of banknotes at commercial banks could be sold at a premium in 
London, while the commercial banks had to buy gold at the premium in London to provide the 
requisite backing to issue banknotes as per the gold standard.18 This was disastrous for the 
commercial banks and led to them trading at a loss and creating a risk of bank failure.  
In response to hardships caused by the gold premium, the commercial banks requested the 
government to release them from the obligations imposed by the gold standard, which required 
them to convert banknotes to gold upon demand.19 In response to the call by the commercial banks, 
a Gold Conference was called in October 1919 aimed at considering methods of safeguarding 
South Africa’s interests and safeguarding its currency.20 It bears mention that the Gold Conference 
did not consider the creation of a central bank.  However, one of the recommendations that 
emanated from the conference was that the government should consider a uniform banking statute 
to replace the four laws in existence in each province.21  
In the Cape of Good Hope, the commercial banks were regulated by the Bank Act of 1891.22 In 
terms of this act notes issued by the commercial banks had to be backed by securities issued with 
 
16South African Reserve Bank Commemorative publication (n 10) 3. 
17 Stephen Gelb (n 12) 1. 
https://www.merriam webster.com/dictionary/gold%20premium – 15 December 2020. Gold Premium means “the 
excess of purchasing power or exchange value of gold currency over another form of money (as paper dollars) of 
nominally equal value”.  
18 South African Reserve Bank Commemorative publication (n 10) 5. 
19 https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/south-african-reserve-bank-established - 05 October 2020. 
20 Factors leading to the founding of the South African Reserve Bank 
https://www.resbank.co.za/AboutUs/Documents/Factors%20leading%20to%20the%20founding%20of%20the%20S
outh%20African%20Reserve%20Bank.pdf – 05 October 2020. 
21 Factors leading to the founding of the South African Reserve Bank (n 20) 3. 





the treasury. Further, the commercial banks could only issue notes to an amount limited to their 
paid-up capital and reserves. 23 The Transvaal banks were regulated in terms of Law No 2 of 1893, 
in terms of which banks could issue notes limited to their paid-up capital. However, unlike the 
position in the Cape, the Transvaal banks were required to have a gold reserve of at least 33%.24 
The reference to gold was to the British Gold sovereign (specie). Banks in the Orange Free State 
were regulated by Ordinance No 20 of 1902 and in the Natal province, the issuing of banknotes 
was not subject to general statutes, but to the Natal Bank (Limited) Laws 1888 to 1912 
Private Act 7 of 1912. The position in the Orange Free State and Natal was relatively similar to 
that in the Transvaal.  
Following the recommendations emanating from the Gold Conference, the Government 
commissioned Sir Henry Strakosch (Strakosch) to assist in the drafting of a uniform banking 
statute.  Following the work done by Strakosch an advisory committee was appointed to consider 
three proposed bills which included: (1) conserving the specie supplies of South Africa by 
providing for the issue of gold certificates; (2) making provision for the establishment of a central 
bank; and (3) creating a uniform statute governing banks in South Africa.25  
On 31 March 1920, a select Committee of Parliament was appointed to consider the practicality of 
establishing a central bank.  The governing South African and Union parties at the time 
recommended that the advice of Strakosch to form a central bank be accepted and that a central 
bank, which was to be privately owned, be established.26 The proposal was adopted by a majority 
vote and led to the SARB being established by a Special Act of Parliament in 1921, in terms of the 
Currency and Banking Act (C & B Act).27 The SARB opened on 30 June 2021 and later acquired 
the sole right to issue banknotes in South Africa.28 
The C & B Act was premised largely on the statute governing the Federal Reserve Bank in the 
United States as is reflective in the name chosen for the South African central bank – before the 
 
23Factors leading to the founding of the South African Reserve Bank (n 20) 3. 
24 Stephen Gelb (n 12) 3. 
25 Kantor “The evolution of monetary policy in South Africa” 1971 Vol 39 SAJE 1 148.  Strakosch was an Austrian 
born British banker. 
26South African Reserve Bank Commemorative publication (n 10) 5.  
27 31 of 1920. 





establishment of the SARB, the term “Reserve” in this context was used solely by the Federal 
Reserve Bank in the US. 
 
2.2 The shareholding and shareholder rights  
 
The SARB was established in terms of section 9 of the C & B Act, as a central bank with private 
shareholders.29 In terms of section 10(1) of the C & B Act, it was established with a share capital 
of one million (South African) pounds.30 On the share capital of the SARB, the commercial banks 
were required to take up not more than 50 percent, while the remainder was offered to the public 
at par value. 31 
Initially, the SARB consisted of a board of directors consisting of eleven directors, six of whom 
were appointed by the shareholders and five by the Governor-General.32 The five directors 
appointed by the Governor-General included the Governor, the Deputy Governor, and three other 
directors referred to as “Government representatives”.33 As regards the six directors appointed by 
the shareholders, three were nominated by the banks and three by the remaining shareholders.34 
Amendments were introduced to the C & B Act, which came into effect on 30 June 1923.35 The 
effect of the amendments was that the commercial banks were no longer required to hold shares 
in the SARB.36 The amendments also resulted in the termination of tenure of the banking 
representative directors in the SARB. 37 These amendments were necessitated by potential 
 
29 Rossouw and Rossouw “Forcing the few: Issues from the South African Reserve Bank’s legal action against its 
delinquent shareholders” 2017 vol 21 SABR 1 6. 
30 De Jager “The South African Reserve Bank: An evaluation of the origin, evolution and status of a central bank 
(part 1)” 2006 SA Merc LJ 159 161: “Of the SARB's share capital, not more than fifty per cent was required to be 
taken up by the commercial banks in South Africa (in proportion to their paid-up capital and reserves), whilst the 
remainder was designated to be offered to the public at par value. Only in the event that the amount designated to 
the general public was not fully subscribed, was the Treasury entitled to take up the number of unsubscribed shares 
at par value and retain or dispose of it.” 
31 De Jager (n 30) 161. 
32 ibid. 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid.  







conflicts of interest that developed when the SARB directors were to discuss advances and 
discounts to commercial banks.38  
The C & B Act limited the number of shares that may be held by an individual or entity to 20 000. 
shares per entity or individual.39 Shareholders could only exercise voting rights at annual general 
meetings if they had held their shares for at least six months before the annual general meeting.   
The C & B Act40 was repealed by the South African Reserve Bank Act in 1944.41 The shareholder 
restrictions established by the C & B Act, remained in place but the limit of shares was reduced 
from 20 000 to 10 000. Existing shareholders who had owned more than 10 000 shares, however, 
were permitted to retain their shares with the provision that their voting rights would be capped at 
the limit of 10 000.42 The South African Reserve Bank Act of 1944 was repealed by the current 
South African Reserve Bank Act43 (the Act) in 1989.  
The SARB is a creature of statute and holds the status of an independent juristic person. It is 
established as the central bank of South Africa in terms of section 223 of the Constitution.44 In 
terms of section 21(1) of the Act, the SARB has an authorised share capital of two million Rand 
which is divided into two million ordinary shares of one rand each. In terms of regulation 5.1 of 
the Regulations Relating to the SARB45 (the Regulations), the shares constitute moveable property 
and are freely transferable, albeit subject to the restrictions imposed by the Act and the 
Regulations.46  
Unlike in the case of “normal” companies incorporated in terms of, or subject to, prevailing South 
African company law statutes, the shareholders are not entitled to a share of the profits of the 
SARB. However, “they are paid a fixed return of ten percent per annum per share on their shares 
held”.47 
 
38 De Jager (n 30) 161. 
39 De Jager (n 30)166. 
40 The C & B Act was amended by Act 22 of 1923, 26 of 1930, 25 of 1932, and 9 of 1933. 
41 29 of 1944. 
42 Rossouw and Rossouw (n 29) 6. 
43 90 of 1989.   
44 De Jager (n 30) 160. 
45 South African Reserve Bank Regulations GN R808 GG 33552 of 13 September 2010. 
46 South African Reserve Bank Regulations (n 45) Regulation 5.1. 





In terms of the Act, the position reflected in the 1944 Act was retained in that shareholders could 
hold no more than 10 000 shares. Existing shareholders with shares more than 10 000 could 
continue to hold such shares but were restricted from acquiring additional shares.48 Further, the 
voting rights of shareholders remained restricted to 10 000 shares. 
The South African Reserve Bank Amendment Act (Amendment Act)49 amended the limitation on 
shareholders to include their “associates”.  This had the effect of restricting any shareholders, 
together with their associates, from holding an aggregate of more than 10 000 shares.50 Further, 
where it appeared that a shareholder together with her, his or its associates held more than 10 000 
shares, the SARB was empowered to approach a court to regularise the matter by seeking, inter 
alia, an order for disposal of shares as determined by the court.51  
The Amendment Act went further to create a disclosure provision that imposed an obligation on a 
shareholder holding, alone or together with an associate or associates, more than 10 000 shares to 
disclose the names of the associates and the number of shares they held in a manner prescribed by 
the SARB.52 After such disclosure, they were permitted to continue holding such shares but were 
barred from acquiring any further shares in the SARB. Further, the voting-rights restriction of 
10 000 applied to shares held by a shareholder or his, her or its associates.53  
The SARB has already taken steps post the Amendment Act to regularise the shareholding of the 
SARB to ensure that a shareholder, together with his or her associates holds no more than 10 000 
shares. On 04 November 2016, the SARB obtained an order in the Pretoria High Court, which 
 
48 s 22(2) of the Act. 
49 4 of 2010. 
50 s 1 of the Act defines “associate” as “shareholders who are family members, subsidiary companies, closes 
corporations and trusts which control one another or are under the control of the South African Reserve Bank 
Shareholder/s”. 
51 s 22(1)(b) of the Act.  
52 s 22(2) of the Act. South African Reserve Bank Regulations (n 45) Regulation 3 requires that a shareholder make a 
disclosure of associates within forty days of promulgation of the SARB regulations (promogulated 13 September 
2010) or within forty days of an event taking place which requires disclosure where the duty to disclose arises after 
date of promulgation. 
53 s 1 read with s 22 and s 23 of the Act. De Jager “The South African Reserve Bank: Blowing winds of change (Part 
1)” 2013 SA Merc LJ 345 n 12: “A shareholder, together with his, her or its associates, is entitled to one vote in respect 
of every 200 shares held (up to a maximum of 50 votes). However, no shareholder who is not ordinarily resident in 
the RSA is entitled to any vote: s 23 of the SARB Act. Shareholders’ meetings of the SARB consist of the Ordinary 
General Meeting, held after the end of the Bank’s financial year end (reg 7 of the Regulations), and the Extraordinary 






directed shareholders who held shares in contravention of section 22(1) of the Act to dispose of 
their shares in aggregate excess of 10 000 shares. 54 
The shareholder voting rights are ordinarily exercisable at ordinary general meetings where the 
shareholders are required to discuss “annual and audit reports of the Bank, appoint the external 
auditors and approve their remuneration, and consider any special business that may have been 
placed on the agenda of the meeting”.55 
It must be noted that where shareholding is reduced to any number below or above the limit of 
10 000, the shareholder and his, her or its associates are precluded from acquiring additional shares 
to equal the previous number of shares held over the limit.56 
The shareholders have a right to elect seven directors from fifteen directors. However, the directors 
must be from candidates confirmed by a panel. The remainder of the directors are appointed by 
the President of the Republic in consultation with the Minister of Finance and the board of directors 
of the SARB.57 The shareholders have a right to elect directors, as opposed to appointing directors.   
Further, the election of directors is subject to confirmation by a panel.58 The panel is to be 
constituted by the Governor. It includes the Governor as chairperson, a retired judge, one other 
person nominated by the Minister, and three persons nominated by the National Economic 
Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC).59 
2.3 The mandate of the SARB 
 
Section 224(1) of the Constitution and section 3 of the Act encapsulate the mandate of the SARB, 
which is to protect the value of the currency in the interest of balanced and sustainable growth. 
The Financial Sector Regulation Act (FSRA)60 amended section 3 of the Act to include the 
 
54 SARB_Annual_Report_2016_17_Shareholding_and_dividend.pdf (onlinereport.co.za) – 12 December 2020. 
55 De Jager (n 53) 345. 
56 s 1, read with s 22 and s 23 of the Act. 
57 s 4(1)(a) of the SARB Act. 
58 s 4(1)(b) of the SARB Act. 
59 s 4(1D). According to De Jager (n 53) 354, the establishment of a panel was intended to give effect to the “fit and 
proper principles” by ensuring that directors elected by shareholders met the required standard set out in the Act.  





responsibility for protecting and maintaining financial stability as defined in the FSRA.61 The 
extension of the mandate of the SARB was in response to the Global Financial Crisis which saw 
the development of the twin peaks model in South Africa.  
The mandate to protect the value of the currency has been interpreted to maintain price stability 
through a formal inflation targeting framework announced by the Minister of Finance in the year 
2000.62 The framework includes maintaining inflation as measured through the Consumer Price 
Index “excluding interest costs, within a target band of three to six percent”.63 The aforesaid 
inflation target was decided upon following consultation between National Treasury and the 
SARB, and ultimately became the benchmark through which the SARB exercises its price-stability 
mandate and ultimately ensures the protection of the value of the currency. 64 
The importance of price stability through inflation is enunciated by Vermeulen as being twofold, 
as follows: 
“firstly, inflation reduces purchasing power, and erodes living standards. Some individuals 
are able to hedge or protect themselves against inflation: salaries can adjust in line with 
inflation, while growth in savings or investments could outperform inflation, thus 
protecting purchasing power. However, the poor and unemployed are unable to protect 
themselves against inflation. These citizens are often reliant upon nominal earnings, such 
as social grants or daily or seasonal wages, if they earn anything at all. They are more 
 
61 Van Heerden and Van Niekerk “The financial stability mandate of the South African central bank in the post – crisis 
landscape” 2018 JIBLR 414 415. 
Section 4(1) of the FRSA describes “financial stability” as follows: “(a) financial institutions generally provide 
financial products and financial services, and market infrastructures generally perform their functions and duties in 
terms of financial sector laws, without interruption; (b) financial institutions are capable of continuing to provide 
financial products and financial services, and market infrastructures are capable of continuing to perform their 
functions and duties in terms of financial sector laws, without interruption despite changes in economic circumstances; 
and (c) there is general confidence in the ability of financial institutions to continue to provide financial products and 
financial services, and the ability of market infrastructures to continue to perform their functions and duties in terms 
of financial sector laws, without interruption despite changes in economic circumstances.” 
62 Vermeulen, C “On the mandate, ownership and independence of the South African Reserve Bank” 2020 23(1),  
South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences 1  6. 
63 Vermeulen (n 62) 6. Inflation Targeting Definition (investopedia.com) – 12 December 2020 “Inflation targeting 
is a central banking policy that revolves around adjusting monetary policy to achieve a specified annual rate of 
inflation. The principle of inflation targeting is based on the belief that long-term economic growth is best achieved 
by maintaining price stability, and price stability is achieved by controlling inflation.” 





vulnerable to price increases, and their incomes are too small to even consider investing in 
inflation-hedging products.” 
The independence of the SARB is guaranteed in terms of section 224(2) of the Constitution which 
states that the SARB, in pursuing its primary objective, must do so independently, without any 
fear, favour, or prejudice, although in regular consultation with the Minister of Finance. 
The interrelation of shareholding, mandate, and independence is considered in the conclusion 
immediately below. 
2.4 Conclusion  
 
The SARB’S mandate to protect the value of the currency is derived from the Constitution and to 
a degree the FSRA.65 Therefore, it is implicit that the SARB does not have the authority to decide 
its mandate.  In this regard, while the Constitution describes the express mandate of the SARB, it 
does not confine the SARB to any specific monetary policy. The SARB has the independence on 
conceptualisation and to decide on the monetary policy necessary to fulfil its mandate as set out in 
the Constitution.  
Therefore, section 224(2) of the Constitution guarantees that the SARB has the right to pursue any 
monetary policy independently for as long as the policy is aligned to the mandate set out in section 
224(1); as Vermeulen aptly puts it, the “SARB is viewed as goal dependent but functionally or 
instrument independent”.66 
While the SARB has private shareholders, the shareholders do not hold the same rights as 
shareholders would in a “normal” company where profit maximisation is the ultimate goal and 
shareholders have the right, inter alia, to amend a memorandum of incorporation, to dictate the 
nature of business a company can engage in and to decide on the strategic goals of a company. The 
SARB shareholders have none of these rights. More importantly, they also do not have the right 
to decide on the mandate of the SARB, because this is constitutional.  
Moreover, as mentioned above, the independence of the SARB is guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Therefore, it is not dependent on the actual shareholding of the SARB.  There is nothing in law 
 






that suggests that private shareholding of the SARB equates to the independence of the SARB and 
that nationalisation erodes independence.67 If this reasoning is to be followed then no nationalised 
central bank can be independent.  
Irrespective of its shareholding, the SARB should retain the independence to pursue its policy 
objectives in line with its constitutional mandate, without its “notional owners” dictating monetary 
policy.68 Therefore, shareholding does not impede the independence of the SARB. At this stage, 
the only thing that can impact the independence of the SARB is a constitutional amendment 
revoking that right.  
Considering the above, a more practical issue to be dealt with is the constitutional effect of the 
proposed SARB Amendment Bill which is considered immediately below.  
3.NATIONALISATION  
3.1 Nationalisation 
Revolution or a change in regimes normally necessitate a change in the economic model of 
countries. This is normally the case in developing countries where certain sections of society were 
oppressed and excluded from economic activity based on race, gender, or even class. Therefore, 
the incoming regimes are faced with alarming levels of inequality and pressure to implement 
structural changes to deal with inequality. 
Due to the prevailing inequalities in developing countries, the governments in charge ordinarily 
take the view that they must own strategic assets and be directly involved in the economy to inform 
structural change in the economy. To own strategic assets in the economy, one of the mechanisms 
used is nationalisation.  These strategic assets include, inter alia, mines, land, or energy generating 
companies. 
In the context of banks some of the notable nationalisations took place in India, when in 1969 the 








nationalised. 69 This move appears to have been necessitated by the fact that approximately 47 
percent of India’s population was living below the poverty line.70 
Nationalisation can be broadly defined as a process by which the state acquires privately owned 
assets, either for compensation or without compensation. This process is ordinarily done through 
statutes enacted by the legislative branch of a government.  
The legal means through which nationalisation is achieved is referred to as an expropriation. 
Expropriation of property may be with or without compensation. Therefore, for there to be any 
form of nationalisation there must be an expropriation.  
South Africa is considered a developing country; therefore, it is no surprise that the ruling ANC 
and the opposing EFF have at different times considered nationalisation as a tool for economic 
development.  It is within this context that we consider the SARB Amendment Bill. 
3.2. SARB Amendment Bill 
On 16 August 2018 Julius Malema tabled the SARB Amendment Bill before parliament. The 
object of the Bill is to amend the SARB Act to ensure that the state is the sole shareholder of the 
SARB and to provide for the appointment of directors to the board by the Minister of Finance. 
Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the intended purpose of the Bill is to ensure the nationalisation 
of the SARB. 
Section 9 of the Bill states that "the state is the sole holder of shares in the Bank and the rights 
attached to the shares in the Bank must be exercised by the Minister of Finance on behalf of the 
state".71 Therefore, the effect of the Bill if passed into law will be that the SARB will no longer 
have any private shareholding as the state will be the sole shareholder, and the current model where 
the SARB has a share capital of two million Rands divided into two million ordinary shares will 
be repealed. I return later to this point below once I have dealt with the other proposed 
amendments.  
 
69 Kannan and Gonsalves “A study of the Economic and Political Aspects of Bank Nationalisation and 
Demonetisation” (March 2018) Journal of Management Research and Analysis 70 70. 
70 Kannan and Gonsalves (n 69) 72. 





The intention of section 2 of the Bill seeks to amend to Act seeks to empower the Minister of 
Finance as the government shareholder representative to appointed seven directors from the 
candidates confirmed by the Panel.72 This amendment is informed by the fact that since the SARB 
will have no private shareholders once the Bill is passed into law, the responsibility to appoint 
additional directors will fall to the Minister of Finance as the shareholder representative of the 
state. 
Section 3 of the Bill states that the SARB will submit its annual reports and financial statements 
to the Minister of Finance and parliament. The consequence of the proposed amendment is that in 
the absence of private shareholding the SARB must report to the Minister of Finance and 
parliament in their roles as shareholder representative and “shareholder”.  
I do not deal with the entire Bill. However, from what is discussed briefly above it is clear that the 
Bill envisages an elevation of the role of the Minister of Finance from one that is currently 
supervisory to an active role. This active role encompasses both the power to appoint directors as 
well as the auditors tasked to audit the public accounts.73 
The more important question to be answered is what vehicle is envisaged by the Bill to ensure that 
the state is the sole shareholder of the SARB. The Bill is silent on the vehicle to be used to ensure 
that current shares are transferred to the state. The Bill does not go so far as to state the transitional 
arrangement for state acquisition of the shares. The Bill does not state whether the expropriation 
of the shares will be for compensation, without compensation or whether the compensation will 
be zero. There seems to be a lacuna in the Bill in this respect.  
In this instance I look to certain portions of the Bill as well as recent comments made by the Deputy 
President of the EFF, Floyd Shivambu, in parliament on the implication of the SARB Amendment 
Bill, in order to ascertain the vehicle which is intended to be used to nationalise the SARB. 
In terms of the Memorandum of Objects of the Bill, the Bill has no financial implications for the 
state. From this, the indication is that the shares currently held by private shareholders are to be 
expropriated without compensation by the state.  The position stated by Floyd Shivambu in the 
Standing Committee on Finance and Select Committee on Finance on 25 August 2020 on the 
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briefing of the Bill, is indicative that an expropriation without compensation is envisaged. He put 
it thus: 
“for public purpose and in the public interest, which is provided for in Section 25 of the 
Constitution, we should take these shares from all these owners without compensation.”74 
In context of the above, I now deal with the constitutional implications of nationalisation as 
intended in the Bill against section 25 of the Constitution and constitutional jurisprudence.  
3.3. Implications of nationalisation of the SARB 
The Bill seeks to ensure that the South African government is the sole shareholder of the SARB. 
Therefore, I examine section 25 of the Constitution and whether the expropriation without 
compensation as envisaged in the SARB Bill is constitutional. 
The concept of expropriation without compensation is not inconceivable or new in South African 
law. The Appellate Division as it was then recognised this as far back as 1915 in the case of Simmer 
& Jack Pty Mines Ltd v Union Government (Minister of Railways & Harbours.75  I note that this 
was a pre-constititutional judgment; however, the aforesaid concept has been recognised in the 
constitutional era. 
In the context of the constitutional era, the position that property may be expropriated without 
compensation may be permissible was mentioned in the case of First National Bank of SA Limited 
t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services76 where the court held that: 
“The formulation of property rights and their institutional framework differ, often widely, 
from legal system to system. Comparative law cannot, by simplistic transference, 
determine the proper approach to our property clause that has its own context, formulation 
and history. Yet the comparative perspective does demonstrate at least two important 
principles. The first is that there are appropriate circumstances where it is permissible for 
statute, in the broader public interest, to deprive persons of property without payment of 
compensation.” 
 
74 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LNOLJiHZ8MA – accessed 11August 2020. 
75 1915 AD 368 at 398: “It is, of course, within the power of the Legislature to deprive an owner of valuable 
property without compensation”. 





Therefore, the stance taken by the EFF that expropriation may take place for the public interest 
without compensation is correct. The political question is whether expropriation of the SARB 
shares without compensation is for a public interest or public purpose. I deal with this aspect below.  
Section 25(1) of the Constitution provides that, “(1) No one may be deprived of property except 
in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property”. 
In First National Bank case the Constitutional Court held that whether there has been a deprivation 
of property is dependent on the extent of the “interference with or limitation of use, enjoyment or 
exploitation” of the property. 77 For current purposes the focus will be squarely on expropriation; 
however, since expropriation is a form of deprivation, I will discuss it at certain points. 
Section 25(2) of the Constitution deals with expropriation and reads as follows: 
 
“(2)  Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application— 
(a)  for a public purpose or in the public interest; and  
(b)  subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of 
payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided 
or approved by a court.” 
 
In Harksen v Lane NO and Others78 the Constitutional Court held that there are two elements that 
differentiate between deprivation and expropriation of property. In the instance of expropriation, 
the state acquires the property in question and permanently. This distinction was aptly put by the 
Constitutional Court in the case of Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy: 
“To prove expropriation, a claimant must establish that the state has acquired the substance 
or core content of what it was deprived of. In other words, the rights acquired by the state 
do not have to be exactly the same as the rights that were lost79… There can be no 
 
77 Agri SA (n 3) 48. Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; 2004 ZACC 9; 2005 1 
SA 530 (CC); 2005 2 BCLR 150 (CC)32: “Whether there has been a deprivation depends on the extent of the 
interference with or limitation of use, enjoyment or exploitation . . . . [A]t the very least, substantial interference or 
limitation that goes beyond the normal restrictions on property use or enjoyment found in an open and democratic 
society would amount to deprivation.” 
78 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) 33 - 40. 





expropriation in circumstances where deprivation does not result in property being 
acquired by the state.”80  
 
As mentioned above, section 25 of the Constitution creates three requirements for an expropriation. 
The first is that the expropriation must be in terms of a law of general application; secondly, it 
must be for a public purpose and/or public interest; and, thirdly, subject to compensation. I will 
discuss whether the SARB Bill sufficiently meets these requirements. 
 
It is trite that issued shares held in a company are regarded as incorporeal movable property. Shares 
always have  a value attached to them (nominal or otherwise)  and give the holder of such shares 
rights as contained in statute or as per the company’s memorandum of  of incorporation. Further, 
shares are transferable and give the holder a claim for any dividend accruing to such shares. The 
shares held by persons in the SARB, therefore, constitute property for purposes of section 25 of 
the Constitution. 
 
Therefore, if the Bill is passed in its current format it will have the effect of permanently taking 
away the shares held by private shareholders and transferring them to the state. The effect is that 
any rights attaching to the shares will be exercised exclusively by the state. Thus, the Bill seeks to 
expropriate shares held by private shareholders and transfer them to the state. Therefore, the Bill 
must be tested against section 25(2) of the Constitution.  
 
As mentioned, section 25(2) requires that an expropriation must be in terms of a law of general 
application.  The Constitution does not define what constitutes a law of general application and 
neither have our courts provided guidance on the issue. In the context of expropriation, the 
Expropriation Act 81 has been found to constitute a law of general application.82 Therefore, if the 
expropriation of shares envisaged in the Bill is through the Expropriation Act, then the 
expropriation would be in terms of a law of general application. However, the Expropriation Act 
 
80  Agri SA (n 3) 58. 
81 63 of 1975. 
82 Slade "The 'law of general application' requirement in expropriation law and the impact of the Expropriation Bill 
of 2015" (2) 2017 De Jure 346 349.  Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corp (Pty) Ltd 





in its current format may not be sufficient to function as a vehicle for the expropriation of shares 
of the SARB, as its primary function on an ordinary grammatical reading is limited to immovable 
or movable tangible property.  
 
In the absence of a definition of law of general application, I offer one. A law of general application 
may be defined as a law that is capable of being applied equally, is not arbitrary, and not contrary 
to the Constitution.  The Bill is silent on the statute or process through which the state will become 
the sole shareholder of the SARB. Therefore, the Bill considered on its own cannot (were it to 
become law) be considered to constitute a law of general application for purposes of expropriation 
of shares in the SARB, as it does not deal with the issue at all. 
 
The importance of laying a statutory basis before expropriation was set out in the case of Joyce & 
McGregor v Cape Provincial Administration,83 where the Appellate Division held that “all rights 
of expropriation must rest upon a statutory foundation”. While the Joyce case is a pre-
constitutional decision, the principle enunciated therein cannot be ignored, being that before an 
expropriation can take place there must be a statutory foundation upon which that expropriation 
must take place. Unfortunately, the Bill is silent on this aspect. Therefore, according to my 
analysis, the Bill fails to be meet the requirement that expropriation must be in terms of a law of 
general application.  While noting that this should naturally be the end of the inquiry, for 
completeness it is necessary to analyze the outstanding requirements.  
 
The second question I deal with is whether the expropriation and transfer of SARB shares from 
private shareholders to the state can be regarded as being for a public purpose or in the public 
interest. In terms of Section 25(4) of the Constitution “public interest includes the nation’s 
commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s 
natural resources”. 
 
The public interest consideration in the Constitution extends to land reform. However, this is not 
exclusive and is wide enough to encompass state ownership of key strategic industries for purposes 
of influencing economic growth.  For purposes of dealing with the public purpose or public interest 
 





requirement. The focus is whether it is for a public purpose or in the public interest for the state to 
be the sole shareholder of the SARB. 
 
The meaning of the words “public purpose” has been dealt with in numerous cases. One notable 
one is the case of Slabbert v Minister van Lande, in which the court held that: 
 
"Hierdie woorde kan 'n breë sowel as 'n enge betekenis hê, maar dit hang af van die         
konteks waarin dit gebruik word. In die breë sin het dit betrekking op die 
dinge waarby die hele bevolking of die lokale publiek geraak word. In die enge sin word 
dit meer gebruik met betrekking tot die saak waarin die Staat of die 
Regering gemoeid is."84 
 
The aforesaid definition was accepted in the cases of Fourie v Minister van Lande en Ander85and 
later in the case of White Rocks Farm (Pty) v Minister of Community Development.86  In essence 
public purposes includes things which affect the general population or specific local public and is 
not limited to matters that pertain to the state or government.  Considering the broad definition of 
the term for “public purpose” the Bill meets this requirement in that it affects the public and more 
specifically a specific group of people (private shareholders).  Further, nationalisation of the SARB 
in the narrow sense may be regarded as a governmental or state purpose.  
 
Public interest, on the other hand, is perhaps wider than public purpose. Ordinarily, what people 
consider to be in the public interest is at times more ideological than legal, in that those who 
support state intervention in the economy for purposes of dealing with market failures or 
inequality, may consider complete state control and ownership of the SARB to be in the public 
 
84 1963 3 SA 620 (T) at 621F; English translation is as follows: "These words can have a broad as well as a narrow 
meaning, but they depend on the context in which they are used. In a broad sense, they refer to the things that affect 
the entire population or the local public. In the narrow sense, it is used more in relation to the case in which the State 
or the Government is involved.” In the case of Rondebosch Municipal Council v Trustees of Western Province 
Agricultural Society 1911 AD 217 at 283 the Innes J as he then was held: “Hence, as it seems to me, public purposes 
may either be all purposes which pertain to and benefit the public in contradistinction to private individuals, or they 
may be those more restricted purposes which relate to the State, and the Government of the country -, that is, 
Governmental purposes”. The Expropriation Act states that "public purpose includes any purpose connected with the 
administration of the provisions of any law by an organ of state".  
85 1970 4 SA 165 (O). 





interest. Supporters may view the SARB as a vehicle to stimulate the economy through, inter alia, 
increased state borrowing at negligible interest rates for socio-economic needs and/or projects. On 
the other hand, proponents of Laissez-faire economics87 may take a stance that government 
ownership of the SARB is not necessary and may stifle the functioning of the SARB or lead to the 
politicisation of the SARB.  
 
The third requirement is that the expropriation must be subject to compensation. Section 25(3) of 
the Constitution states that: 
 
“The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and 
equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of 
those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including  
a. the current use of the property; 
b. the history of the acquisition and use of the property; 
c. the market value of the property; 
d. the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital 
improvement of the property; and 
e. the purpose of the expropriation.” 
 
Section 25(3) of the Constitution requires an equitable balance of all the factors listed therein. 
Unfortunately, the mantra has been to centralise market value in the discussion around 
compensation. This position has been dealt with by the Constitutional Court in the case of Du Toit, 
where the court held that: 
 
“Section 25(3) indeed does not give market value a central role. Viewed in the context of 
our social and political history, questions of expropriation and compensation are matters 
 
87 Laissez-Faire Definition, Policies, and Examples (thebalance.com) – 22 November 2020.  “Laissez-faire economics 
is a theory that restricts government intervention in the economy. It holds that the economy is strongest when all the 





of acute socio-economic concern and could not have been left to be determined solely by 
market forces.”88   
 
Unfortunately, the SARB Bill does not deal with or attempt to deal with whether the expropriation 
of the SARB shares will be subject to compensation, or whether the compensation will be nil or if 
a certain value will be attached.  The Bill only indicates that there are no financial implications, 
which presupposes that the compensation will be nil. However, in the absence of any clear 
provisions, the Bill falls short of the standard set out in section 25(2). 
 
In conclusion, the Bill as it stands may not pass constitutional muster as it does not state the statute 
or process through which the state will become the sole shareholder in the SARB. Further, in the 




4.1 Central Banks with private shareholding 
State shareholding in central banks has become the norm; however, there are central banks that 
still have private shareholders. This dissertation would not be complete without a comparative 
study of some of the central banks with private shareholders, namely Belgium, Greece, Italy, and 
Japan.89  
The Belgian central bank has an issued share capital of €10 million, which is represented in the 
form of 400 000 shares.90 The shares have a nominal value of €25 per share.91 The Belgian state 
 
88 Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2005 11 BCLR 1053 (CC); 2006 1 SA 297 (CC) 36. The decision in the case of 
Uys no v Msiza 2018 3 SA 440 (SCA) undermines that principle by placing market value at the centre of what is 
ultimately just and equitable.  J Zimmerman “Property on the Line: Is an Expropriation-centered Land Reform 
Constitutionally Permissible?” (2005) 122 SALJ 378 at 417 The shared emphasis on market value in the policy and 
jurisprudence on the new property clause appears to stem from an extreme wariness of nonquantifiable Constitutional 
compensation factors and an over reliance on transnational or 'universal' compensation doctrine. Where the flexible 
and unusual provisions of s 25 have the potential to differentiate the South African property clause from its 
comparative analogs, they are either ignored or attributed very cautious and conservative content.” 
89 I must pay homage to Rossouw who is one of the few academics to have written in-depth on private shareholding 
in central banks. 
90 Rossouw “Private Shareholding: An Analysis of an Eclectic Group of Central Banks” 2016 SAJEMS 150 155. 





holds 50 percent shares in the bank, while the remainder of the shares are held by private 
companies and individuals,92 and listed on the NYSE Euronext.93 According to Rossouw “each 
share confers the right to one vote at the general meeting of shareholders and the statute of the 
bank does not limit shareholding or voting in any way”.94 
The Belgian central bank pays to shareholders a first annual dividend of 6% of the share capital, 
which amounts to €1.5 per share.95 Thereafter, a second dividend is payable which is calculated as 
“50 percent of the net proceeds from the portfolio of assets which the bank holds in counterpart to 
its total reserves, after deduction of corporate tax”.96 
The Belgian central bank, like the SARB, has private shareholders, however, but also has state 
shareholding while the SARB does not.  They are similar to the extent that both do not have any 
shares held by commercial banks. Further, they do not impose any form of restrictions based on 
citizenship, insofar as it pertains to the holding of shares in the central bank. The Belgian central 
bank is vastly distinct from the SARB as it has state shareholding, and the remainder of its shares 
are listed on a stock exchange. In contrast, the SARB is completely held by private shareholders 
and the shares are traded on an over-the-counter market.  
The Belgian model presents a combination of private and state shareholding of a central bank, 
which can be explored by South Africa if there is any appetite to maintain private shareholding 
with inclusion of state shareholding in the SARB. 
The Greek central bank has 19 864 886 shares with a nominal value of €5.60 per share with an 
issued share capital that amounts to €111 243 362.00.97  The shares may be held by juristic persons 
or natural persons. In terms of Article 8 of the Bank of Greece Statute, the Greek Government and 
public enterprises are precluded from holding more than 35 percent of if the issued share capital 
of the central bank. 98 The Bank of Greece has a dual mandate, with the primary mandate being to 
 











maintain and ensure price stability.  The secondary mandate is to support the general economic 
policy of the Government.99  
 
In terms of Article 13 of the Bank of Greece Statute every shareholder, who owns at least seventy-
five shares and has been registered as a shareholder for not less than three months before the 
general meeting shall be entitled to vote at the general meeting.100 Notably, only persons with 
Greek citizenship and companies incorporated in Greece are permitted to exercise voting rights at 
an annual general meeting of the Greece Central Bank.101  According to Rossouw, the Bank of 
Greece pays shareholders a first annual dividend valued at 12 percent of the nominal value of the 
shares, where there is a surplus, Further,  depending on the profitability of the bank, a 
supplementary second dividend is determined annually by the General Council of the bank. 102 
 
The Greek central bank is more similar in shareholding structure to the SARB than the Belgian 
central bank is. This is because both the Greek central Bank and the SARB have no government 
and bank shareholding.  Further, Greece, Italy, and South Africa are the only countries with central 
banks that have no state shareholding. All the other central banks that have maintained private 
shareholding, which include Belgium, Japan, Switzerland, and Turkey, have some government 
shareholding. It must be noted that the SARB is the only central bank on the African continent and 
in the “developing” world that has no government shareholding.  
 
The Greek central bank’s restrictions on limits of shares to be held as imposed on the shareholding 
are novel as they are imposed on the state and public enterprises as opposed to private shareholders 
as is the case in the South African context. Further, in both cases of the Greek central bank and the 
SARB, government shareholding is not precluded; it appears the right to acquire shares has not 
been exercised by either of the two governments.  
Notably, and in contrast, the SARB does not restrict voting rights based on citizenship or country 
of incorporation in the case of companies.  
 
 
99 Bank of Greece Statute Section I Article 4. 
100 Rossouw (n 90) 155. Bank of Greece Statute Tenth Edition Section III Article 13. 
101 Bank of Greece Statute Tenth Edition Section III Article 14. 





The Italian central bank has a share capital of €7,500,000,000 in registered shares with a nominal 
value of €25,000.103 The shares in the Italian bank may be held by banks and insurance and 
reinsurance firms, which are legally registered and have head offices in Italy.104 Currently, there 
is a limit of 3 percent on the share capital that a shareholder may hold.105 If a shareholder holds 
shares in excess of the 3%, no voting rights will be attached to the excess shares.106 The shares are 
transferable, but only with the prior consent of the board of directors of the central bank.107 The 
shareholders have no control over the central bank’s institutional functions, which include inter 
alia, formulation of monetary policy. 108 
 
The right to exercise voting rights in the Italian central bank is aptly put by Rossouw as follows:  
“shareholders who have held 100 or more shares for at least three months before a meeting 
of shareholders have the right to attend shareholders’ meetings. Shareholders entitled to 
attend have one vote for every 100 shares held up to 500 shares, and one vote for every 
500 shares held over and above the first 500, but voting per shareholder, irrespective of the 
number of shares held, is limited to a maximum of 50 votes.”109 
The Italian central bank is similar in shareholding structure to the SARB in that both central banks 
have no government shareholding.  However, they are distinct in that banks have an official 
shareholding in the central bank while banks do not have any shares in the SARB. The SARB has 
no restriction on who may hold shares. This contrasts with the Italian central bank where shares 
may be held by banks and insurance and reinsurance firms, which are legally registered and have 
head offices in Italy   
 
 





108 Prammer, Reiss and Köhler-Töglhofer “The financial relations between the National bank and the government” 
(2016) Monetary Policy & The Economy Q3– Q4/16 78. 





The Japanese central bank has an issued share capital of ¥100 million, which is represented in the 
form of one million shares, which have a nominal value of ¥100 per share. 110 The Bank of Japan 
Act requires that the amount of contribution by the government shall be no less than ¥55 million.111 
The minimum contribution set for the Japanese government imposes an obligation on the Japanese 
government to hold at least 55% of the shares in the Japanese central bank. The shares in the central 
bank are traded on the JASDAQ Securities Exchange. 112 Natural and juristic persons are permitted 
to hold shares in the bank. Further, there appears to be no restriction on holding shares in the bank 
based on citizenship or residency.  
Oddly enough, according to Rossouw, the Japanese central bank does not convene an annual 
shareholder meeting.113 The dividend payable to shareholders is prescribed by the Bank of Japan 
Act which dividend shall not exceed 5 percent of the nominal issue value of the shares, which 
equates to ¥5 per share per annum. 114 
The Japanese central bank like the Belgian central bank presents an alternative to complete state 
shareholding and complete private shareholding. These models are indicative that a hybrid of 
private and state shareholding in a central bank is structurally achievable. In any event, the model 
may be inconsequential to the extent that the mandate of a central bank is governed by statute, as 
is the case with the SARB. 
4.2. Nationalisation of central banks in foreign jurisdiction 
In this paragraph, I will deal briefly with nationalisation of the Austrian central bank, which was 
the last central bank to be nationalised. 
State ownership of central banks was a common theme and according to De Kock, by 1935 most 
of the central banks were state owned. 115 Nationalisation was motivated by several factors which 
 
110 Rossouw (n 90) 155. 
111 Bank of Japan Act No 89 of June 18, 1997 Article 8. 
112 Rossouw (n 90) 156. 
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include instability caused by the world wars, the change in regimes, and the need to respond to 
socio-economic issues of the time.  
As mentioned, the last central bank to be nationalised is the Austrian Central Bank, which was 
nationalised in 2010. Before 2010, the Austrian central bank permitted shareholding by its 
government, Austrian citizens, and legal entities that have their head offices in Austria. 116 This is 
distinct from the SARB and Belgium which does not restrict who may hold shares in their central 
banks.  The Austrian government at the time held 70.27 percent of the share capital, with the 
Austrian banks holding the remainder of the shares. 117 
According to Rossouw, the nationalisation of the Austrian central bank was aimed at increasing 
the supervisory role of the Austrian government on the bank. This was also done to avoid any 
conflicts of interest that may arise as a result of the commercial banks holding shares in the central 
bank. The conflict of interest issue is reminiscent of the predicament faced by the SARB before 
the 1923 amendments to the C & B Act, where the commercial banks were still required to take 
up shares in the SARB.  
4.3 Central banks with dual mandates 
In this paragraph, I will deal with developmental policies that have been adopted by central banks. 
However, to set the scene, I will briefly set out the current dominant policy pertaining to central 
banking.   
Since the development of central banks, there has been a policy shift depending on the regime in 
place and the level of development of the country in question. The accepted practice for central 
banks which is accepted by prominent economists and institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund is premised on (1) central bank independence, (2) inflation targeting, and (3) the 
use of methods of monetary policy. 118 
The concept of central-bank independence is the freedom of central banks to formulate and 
determine monetary policy without any political interference. The component of inflation targeting 
 
116 Rossouw (n 90) 155. 
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is focused on price stability and does not focus on direct measures such as “promoting full 
employment, supporting industrial policy or allocating credit to sectors of special social need”.119 
This approach to central banking has been termed the “neo-liberal”,120 and is closely linked with 
laissez-faire economics. 121 I will refer to the aforesaid policy as the liberal approach to central 
banking.     
The neo-liberal approach to central banking is not embedded in a development agenda but is 
premised on no support for government spending and no engagement on credit allocation policies 
to support strategic sectors of the economy. 122  
Proponents of the neo-liberal approach to central banking argue that this approach delivers “low 
inflation with no negative impacts on output, investment, unemployment, or any other important 
macroeconomic variable”.123 There is no denying that inflation erodes buying power and therefore 
living standards. While there are people in society who are protected from inflation through access 
to existing or historical wealth, above-inflation salary increases or access to investments that 
perform above the rate of inflation 124  
However, in developing countries most persons are unemployed, living on seasonal wages or 
social grants.125 This group of people is unable to protect itself against inflation because its 
members are poor and unemployed.126 The aforesaid predicament resulted in some countries, 
initially in the 1960s, adopting an economic developmental mandate to central banking, which 
includes, inter alia, employment and growth mandates.   
The aforesaid is perhaps best captured by the former Governor of the central bank of India Mr PC 
Bhattacharyya, who described the role of India’s central bank in the 1960s as follows:  
 
 
119 Epstein (n 118) 1. 
120 Neoliberalism is defined as “the idea that less government interference in the free market is the central goal of 
politics.” What is Neoliberalism? – ReviseSociology – 06 December 2020. 
121 Laissez-faire economics is a policy that supports limited government involvement in the economy or economic 
affairs. Loosely translated Laissez-fair means “leave us alone”. 
122 Epstein (n 118) 1. 
123 Epstein, (n 118) 4. 







“India has consciously chosen a policy of planned economic development … The 
traditional objective of a central bank is the maintenance of price and exchange stability. 
However, this is but a means to achieve economic progress rather than an end in itself. In 
the context of the developing countries, these objectives … have to be fitted into the 
broader and more compelling urge for furthering economic growth … A country must have 
an appropriate degree of monetary expansion to meet the increasing requirements of a 
growing economy … The aim of a central bank in a developing country has, therefore, to 
be the adoption of adequate policies which aim at bringing about an appropriate degree of 
monetary expansion along with price and exchange stability … Further, monetary policy 
in such a country has also to provide for mobilization of resources to the maximum possible 
extent, as well as provide for the most efficient investment of the same for purposes of 
development.”127 
 
This aforesaid statement is opposed to the neo-liberal approach to central banking, in that it seeks 
to place both monetary and economic policy at the centre of a central bank's mandate. The 
aforesaid statement advocates for a dual mandate for central banks, one focused on the traditional 
central banking function of maintaining price stability, and the other premised on the need for 
economic growth, aligned with government policy. In dealing with the issue of a dual mandate I 
will deal briefly with the Federal Reserve (the Fed), the New Zealand central bank, and the 
Australian central bank. 
 
The Fed was established in terms of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. At the time of its inception 
the Fed had no macroeconomic policy or goals.128 Its core function was to mitigate against 
financial panics and bank runs, by providing loans to the banking system.129  Today the Fed has 
the following goals: (1) stable prices; and (2) maximum employment, and moderate long-term 
interest rates. Despite the above, the Fed is considered to have a dual mandate of price stability 
and maximum employment.  The maximum employment is conceptualised by the Fed as “the 
 
127 Epstein (n 118) 13. 
128 Thorbecke “A Dual Mandate for the Federal Reserve: The Pursuit of Price Stability and Full Employment” 
Spring 2002 Eastern Economic Journal 255 255. 





highest level of employment or lowest level of unemployment that the economy can sustain while 
maintaining a stable inflation rate”.130 
 
The New Zealand central bank is one of the central banks that has a dual mandate. Initially, the 
New Zealand central bank, like most central banks, focused primarily on price stability achieved 
through a policy of inflation targeting.131 As of April 2019, the New Zealand central bank’s 
mandate was expanded to included “supporting maximum sustainable employment”.132 Similar to 
the case of the Fed there are no numerical targets set for employment. However, the emphasis 
appears to be that the aforesaid central banks must formulate policies that will result in 
employment opportunities or the creation of an economic environment for sustainable 
employment.  
 
The Reserve Bank of Australia also features amongst the central banks with mandates which fall 
outside the traditional central bank mandate of price and currency stability. The Reserve Bank of 
Australia's powers and function are regulated in terms of the Reserve Bank Act 1959. Its mandate 
is to “contribute to the stability of the currency, full employment, and the economic prosperity and 
welfare of the Australian people”.133 
 
While the aforesaid central banks are similar in that they all have mandates other than price 
stability or maintaining price stability, they all have adopted a mandate of maximum or full 
employment. The approach is therefore that there is an obligation on the central bank to develop 
monetary policies that have a direct or indirect impact on employment in the economy.  
 
Notably, the Saudi Central Bank has a mandate of monetary stability, promoting confidence in the 
financial sector, and supporting economic growth. 134 The Saudi Central Bank is notable in the 
sense that it has an economic growth mandate, which, one may argue, extends beyond the mandate 
of full or maximum employment.   
 
130 The Fed - What economic goals does the Federal Reserve seek to achieve through its monetary policy?- 11 
December 2020. 
131 Monetary policy - Reserve Bank of New Zealand (rbnz.govt.nz) – 11 December 2020.  
132 ibid.  
133 About the RBA | RBA – 11 December 2020. 






The danger that exists with a wider mandate is that the dual mandates of the central bank may 
conflict depending on the policies used to fulfil each mandate. This is perhaps why a 
developmental mandate has not been advocated for central banks around the world, including the 
SARB.  
In considering the aforesaid central banks, central bank mandates are not confined to price or 
currency stability and financial stability only. The mandates of central banks may be amended or 
expanded to the extent permitted by empowering statute. Therefore, similar to the aforesaid central 
banks, it is suggested that the mandate of the SARB is not cast in stone and may be expanded to 
accommodate developmental and employment goals.  
 
4.4.  Reconsidering or expanding the mandate of the SARB 
 
In this paragraph, I deal with the question of whether the mandate of the SARB can be expanded 
or amended to accommodate a development agenda. Secondly, I deal with the effects of such an 
amendment on the independence of the SARB.  
The mandate of the SARB is to protect the value of the currency in the interest of balance and 
protecting and maintaining financial stability as defined in the FSRA. The current mandate of the 
SARB is in line with accepted mandates of many central banks in the world. 
As stated in paragraph 4.2 above, central banks across the world have a wide range of statutory 
mandates. The SARB is unique in that its mandate is contained not only in a statute but in the 
Constitution.  This means that the mandate of the SARB may be expanded through an amendment 
to the Constitution in terms of section 74, to include, for example, a developmental mandate 
relating to the promotion of employment or economic growth.  Alternatively, the Act and the FSR 
may be amended to expand on the mandate of the SARB. In both instances, the legislature will 
have to determine the mandate of the SARB.  
As mentioned, the independence of the SARB is guaranteed in terms of section 224(2) of the 
Constitution which states that the SARB, in pursuing its primary objective, must do so 





Minister of Finance. Thus, while the SARB cannot determine its mandate, it has the independence 
to determine monetary policy. 
Considering the above, an amendment to the mandate of the SARB, will not affect the 
independence of the SARB. It will only result in an expanded mandate. The SARB will retain 
monetary policy independence. It will however have to formulate policy to give expression to any 
expanded statutory mandate, be it full employment or economic growth.  
The expansion of a central bank’s mandate does not appear to be overly problematic. The most 
problematic aspect appears to be a formulation of monetary policy to give life to mandates other 
than price stability and financial stability, which are easily dealt with through inflation targeting. 
It is noteworthy that the Fed has faced difficulties in implementing monetary policy to fulfil its 
mandate of maximum employment and has over time predominately focused on price stability. 
Therefore, while the mandate of the SARB may be expanded to include, inter alia, maximisation 
of employment or economic growth, for these mandates to be fulfilled there must be a sound 
monetary policy in place.  
5. CONCLUSION 
The nationalisation of the SARB is and will continue to be a strongly-debated issue in South 
Africa. However, complete state ownership of central banks is the norm and that there are only a 
select few central banks in the world that have maintained private shareholders. This ranges from 
central banks that have maintained both government and private shareholders, including 
shareholding by commercial banks. 
The central features of the SARB are its mandate and independence as contained in the 
Constitution.  The shareholders have limited rights which pertain to election of directors and voting 
on limited issues at ordinary general meetings. Since the mandate of the SARB is contained in the 
Constitution and to an extent in the FSR, only the legislature has the power to amend the mandate 
of the SARB. Therefore, nationalisation of the SARB will have no effect on the mandate of the 
SARB. To argue otherwise is in fact disingenuous. 
The independence of the SARB is contained in the Constitution and is not a consequence of private 
shareholders, as private shareholders have little to no involvement in the government and 





independence is a fallacy. Otherwise, the assumption must be made that all central banks with state 
shareholding are not independent. The concept of independence pertains to the ability of a central 
bank to develop monetary policy free from political interference. Therefore, nationalisation of the 
SARB will not compromise the independence of the SARB. The only action that may compromise 
the independence of the SARB is an amendment to the Constitution removing the guarantee of 
independence. 
The SARB Amendment Bill which seeks to seeks to serve as a vehicle for nationalisation of the 
SARB may not pass constitutional muster. The Bill currently provides no statutory mechanism or 
transitional arrangements for the expropriation of SARB shares without compensation. Further, 
the Bill does not go so far as to state whether the envisaged expropriation will be with or without 
compensation. The unintended consequences of the Bill are that if it is passed in its current format 
it will have the effect of arbitrarily depriving existing shareholders of their property.  
The debate around ownership of the SARB is more symbolic than anything else; however, it may 
be a vehicle for more government supervision as seen in the case of the Austrian central bank. If 
the SARB is seen as a vehicle to deal with the bleak socio-economic state of affairs in South Africa. 
Then  the most effective way equip the SARB to deal with socio-economic issues is to change or 
expand the mandate of the SARB to include a growth mandate as seen in the case of the Saudi 
central bank or an employment maximisation mandate as seen in the case of the Fed. However, 
even in the event of a change of mandate the SARB will retain policy independence to fulfil its 
mandate. 
In closing the nationalisation of the SARB will not affect the mandate, independence or 
functioning of the SARB. Private shareholders do not serve as a base for central bank 
independence; therefore, the issue of who holds shares in the SARB is ultimately symbolic to the 
extent that the central issue relates to its mandate and independence. While nationalisation of the 
SARB remains open to the state, if the real issue concerns the mandate of the SARB on economic 
growth, this will be better resolved by expanding the mandate of the SARB to cater for economic 
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